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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000011

SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [PREF](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)

SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN RAPPROCHEMENT GAINS MOMENTUM AS GOC

GIVES JEM ULTIMATUM: "DOHA IS YOUR LAST CHANCE."

REF: A. NDJAMENA 004

[B.](#) NDJAMENA 003

[C.](#) 09 NDJAMENA 621

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SUMMARY AND

COMMENT

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[11.](#) (SBU) Chad-Sudan rapprochement has gained significant momentum, with the GoC last week having given the JEM an ultimatum on the need to travel to Doha and negotiate in good faith, or "go it alone from here on." A Sudanese technical team arrived in N'Djamena January 7, and a heavy-weight Sudanese political/military delegation headed by Dr. Ghazi is scheduled to come here January 8. The Sudanese have two goals: first, they want to advance Chad-Sudan rapprochement politically, in parallel to the work of the technical team on implementation of the planned border monitoring program. Second, the Sudanese delegation plans to speak with the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim here in N'Djamena, in a meeting arranged by the GoC.

[12.](#) (SBU) This getting really interesting. The new momentum in Chad-Sudan rapprochement lies in the convergence of the paths of the two governments. The GOC and GOS are advancing their national goals and relations at the expense of JEM and Chad rebels in Sudan. The Chadians will be looking for Sudan to give an "ultimatum" to Chad rebels there, just as the GoC did to the JEM. The idea of the GOC and the GOS talking to JEM with the same message is indeed intriguing. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

[13.](#) (SBU) In a conversation with Ambassador Nigro and DCM January 7, Chadian Ambassador to the U.S. Adoum Bechir reported that Sudan's technical delegation charged with working out a bilateral border-monitoring plan had arrived earlier in the day, and that a political/military delegation headed by Ghazi Sallahuddin and including Intel Chief Atta, FMA SYG Mutriq, and Doha Negotiator Amin Hassan Ouman, would arrive January 8. In addition to giving political blessing to the work of the technical team, the political delegation would meet in N'Djamena with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in the aim of trying to make progress on a JEM settlement with the GOS.

¶4. (SBU) The GoC had set the table for the Sudan-JEM meeting, said Bechir, by sending its own high-level delegation to Am Djarras last week to give Khalil an ultimatum from President Deby: "Either go to Doha and negotiate seriously in a logic of peace, or go it alone." The Chadian delegation to Am Djarras, consisting of FORMIN Faki, Interior Minister Bachir, Infrastructure Minister Younousmi, Ambassador to Libya (and brother of the President) Daoussa Deby, Intel Chief Chaibo, National Assembly First Vice President and Ambassador to the U.S. Bechir, had made clear that the GoC at the highest level had decided to make peace with Sudan. The GoC viewed Doha as the JEM's "last chance to move forward peacefully." The delegation had specified that "if the JEM chose to take up arms after Doha and go to war, it would go alone." Furthermore, it would no longer be welcome in Chad. "Our support for the JEM, except as a peaceful political movement in Sudan, has ended; this is the President's decision," the delegation told Khalil. "We want to turn the page definitively on our relations with Sudan and the JEM."

¶5. (SBU) In response to the GoC demarche, Khalil had repeated familiar themes, said Ambassador Bechir: "We'll go to Doha, but we are not hopeful. Sudan has stacked the cards against us." "Sudan wants us to be a tooth on the wheel" along with other ephemeral, GoS-fabricated civil-society players. "We aren't a tooth, we are the wheel."

¶6. (SBU) The JEM did accept the GoC delegation's invitation to arrange a direct, high-level GoS-JEM meeting in N'Djamena, which would take place with Ghazi representing the GoS

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January 8. The Sudanese were already aware of what had happened at the Am Djarras talks. In fact, the GoC had told Atta, "You know you can trust us. You have already heard through your own sources what happened at Am Djarras. Now you must give your Chadian rebel clients a similar message."

¶7. (SBU) Bechir noted that the GoC still had doubts about GoS sincerity overall, and especially about its intention to break definitively with Chadian rebels. He added that the discovery in Tisse, southeastern Chad, of new rebel land mines was proof that anti-Chadian rebels were still capable of causing problems for the GoC.

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COMMENT  
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¶8. (SBU) This getting really interesting. The new momentum in Chad-Sudan rapprochement lies in the convergence of the paths of the two governments. The GOC and GOS are advancing their national goals and relations at the expense of JEM and Chad rebels in Sudan. The Chadians will be looking for Sudan to give an "ultimatum" to Chad rebels there, just as the GoC did to the JEM. The idea of the GOC and the GOS talking to JEM with the same message is indeed intriguing.

¶9. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO